Section 13(d) and Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership by Editors,
COMMENT
SECTION 13(d) AND DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE
EQUITY OWNERSHIP
The Williams Act, passed by Congress in 1968, was entitled "An
Act [p]roviding for full disclosure of corporate equity ownership of
securities under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934."' At the time,
few understood the Act to be anything other than a law requiring dis-
closure of information by those who attempt to gain control of a corpo-
ration through a device known as the tender offer.2 The Act was
broader, however, amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934' by
adding sections 13 (d) and (e), as well as the tender offer provisions in
sections 14(d), (e), and (f).' Section 13(d) established a searching
disclosure requirement for persons who become direct or indirect bene-
ficial owners of more than ten percent of any equity security registered
under section 12 of the Exchange Act,' subject to certain exemptions.6
' Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, amending Securities
Exchange Act §§ 12-14, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l-n (1964).
2The term tender offer generally refers to a solicitation of shareholders of an
issuer to tender their shareholdings to the party making the offer. The offeror's
consideration may be expressed either in cash or in other securities, giving rise to
the terms "cash tender offer" and "stock tender offer." While the former is
commonly referred to as simply a "tender offer" and the latter as an "exchange
offer," the Williams Act used the term "tender offer" in § 14(d) without definition
and then exempted offers made "by means of a registration statement under the
Securities Act of 1933," namely situations where the consideration was another
security. § 14(d) (8) (A), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (8) (A) (Supp. V, 1970). Discussions
of cash tender offers are numerous and exhaustive, both before the Williams Act, e.g.,
Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REv.
317 (1967); Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, HARv. Bus. REv.,
Mar.-Apr. 1967, at 135; Swanson, S. 510 and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers:
Distinguishing St. George from the Dragon, 5 HARv. J. LEGIS. 431 (1968), and after,
e.g., Schmults & Kelly, Disclosure in Connection with Cash Take-over Bids: The
New Regulations, 24 Bus. LAw. 19 (1968); Note, Cash Tender Offers, 83 HARv.
L. REv. 377 (1969). The Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 4, 84 Stat. 1497,
deleted this exemption, thus broadening the Act's application to all types of tender
offers.
3 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-hh (1964) [hereinafter referred to as Exchange Act].
-Id. §§ 78m (d)-.(e), 78n(d)-(f) (Supp. V, 1970). In addition, the Act amended
Exchange Act § 12(i), id. § 781(i), "to make clear that the authority and responsi-
bility to administer and enforce the new disclosure provisions . . . , insofar as they
apply to the securities of banks, will be vested in the various Federal banking agencies
rather than in the Securities and Exchange Commission." S. REP. No. 550, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1967).
515 U.S.C. §781 (1964).
6Id. §§78m(d) (5) (A)-(D) (Supp. V, 1970), redesignated §§78m(d) (6) (A)-
(D) by Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 1(b), 84 Stat. 1497; 17 C.F.R.
§240.13d-4 (1971). Exchange Act §13(e), 15 U.S.C. §78m(e) (Supp. V, 1970),
makes unlawful any purchases by an issuer of its own securities in contravention
of any rules promulgated thereunder by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(Commission) to prevent fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts. Rule 13e-1, 17
C.F.R. § 240.13e-1 (1971), requires disclosure of background information when repur-
chases are made while a tender offer is outstanding. Proposed rule 13e-2, SEC Secu-
rities Exchange Act Release No. 8930 (July 13, 1970), 35 Fed. Reg. 11,410 (1970),
would place price and volume limits on repurchases undertaken at any time.
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The disclosure required went beyond mere identification of the acquirers
to include pertinent details of the actual transactions involved. 7 Because
disclosure requirements are placed on those who are already large share-
holders rather than those who may acquire stock at some future date,
section 13 (d) has the potential to affect greatly the internal distribution
of corporate power. Both during the debate over the Williams Act and
since that time, however, the section has been generally ignored-in part
because of the drama surrounding the accompanying tender offer legis-
lation,8 and in part because of its limited impact at the ten percent level.9
No consistent, workable rationale has been developed to guide the
application of this section, despite its broad impact on shareholder at-
tempts to exert control over corporate management. The decision of
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Bath Industries, Inc. v.
Blot,"0 the first reported instance of a contested suit involving the dis-
closure requirements of section 13 (d) outside the context of a tender
offer," manifests the confusion surrounding application of the section.
The recent passage of Public Law 91-567,1' an act which inter alia
amended section 13 (d) by lowering the level of equity security owner-
ship triggering the disclosure requirements from ten percent to five
percent, broadens the section's impact and makes even more pressing the
need to come to grips with the confusion.
This Comment will suggest that while the potential impact of
section 13 (d) was never adequately explained or discussed prior to
enactment, Congress did articulate its underlying purpose: giving notice
to investors of potential changes in corporate management, thus allow-
ing the market to adjust its evaluation of the corporation's worth. Ac-
cordingly, this Comment will argue that section 13 (d) was intended as
a broad disclosure provision exposing every rapid, large-scale aggre-
gation of equity securities, regardless of the method or the purpose of
715 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d) (1) (A)-(E) (Supp. V, 1970); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-2 to
-101 (1971).
8 This is evidenced by the depth of interest in the subject. See note 2 supra.
9 Through June 1970 the Commission had received a total of only 542 filings under
§ 13 (d). Hearings on H.R. 4285, S. 3431, & S. 336 Before the Subconnn. on Coln-
merce & Finance of the Honse Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 4 (1970) (Memorandum of the Commission). Of these, 160 had been filed
within the preceding 5 months. See Hearings on, S. 336 & S. 3431 Before the Sub-
comm. on, Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking & Currency, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 9 (1970) (testimony of Commission Chairman Hamer H. Budge). Those
persons directly affected at the 10% level were apparently either few in number or
little desirous of appearing before the subcommittees to object. But many objections
were voiced when the disclosure level was to be lowered to 5%. See sources cited
note 97 infra.
10D427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970).
"1A subsequent district court case has also been reported. GAF Corp. v.
Milstein, [Current] CCH SEc. L. REP. 1192,975 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 1971) (discussed
at notes 89-91 infra & accompanying text). One Commission enforcement proceed-
ing was brought against a group which included Madison Square Garden Corp., but
was terminated by a consent decree prior to a hearing on the merits. SEC v.
Madison Square Garden Corp., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
92,649 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 1970).
12 Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497.
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accumulation. Following this analysis, the Comment will suggest that
the Seventh Circuit, endeavoring to dilute the advantage disclosure af-
fords incumbent corporate management against outside control suitors,
has limited application of the section to a narrower class than intended
by Congress. The effect of this narrowing is to take away intended
investor protection, while barely reducing management advantage.
I. THE WILLIAMS ACT
A. The Statutory Scheme
Section 13 (d) (1) of the Exchange Act now provides:
Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the
beneficial ownership of any equity security . . . is directly or
indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 5 per centum of
such class shall, within ten days after such acquisition, send to
the issuer of the security at its principal executive office, by
registered or certified mail, send to each exchange where the
security is traded, and file with the Commission, a statement
containing such of the following information, and such addi-
tional information, as the Commission may by rules and regu-
lations prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors .... 13
The disclosure required includes the background and identity of the
acquirers, the source of their financing, the size of their shareholdings,
information as to any "contracts, arrangements, or understandings with
any person with respect to any securities of the issuer," and, if the pur-
pose of the acquisition is "to acquire control of the business," any plans
or proposals to make major changes.14 The class of persons subject to
the disclosure requirements of section 13 (d) (1) also includes those de-
fined in section 13(d) (3) :
When two or more persons act as a partnership, limited
partnership, syndicate, or other group for the purpose of ac-
quiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an issuer, such
syndicate or group shall be deemed a "person" for the purposes
of this section. 5
13Id. §1(a), amending 15 U.S.C. §78m(d)(1) (Supp. V, 1970). The dis-
cussion of § 13 (d) in this Comment will be in terms of the Williams Act as amended,
with a 5W disclosure level. The only deviation from this format will be in the
discussion of Bath Industries, Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970). Text
accompanying notes 58-85 infra. The discussions of the Williams Act's rationale and
the nature of its ramifications are valid for either a 10% or 5% disclosure level.
1415 U.S.C. §§78m(d)(1)(A)-(E) (Supp. V, 1970).
15 Id. § 78m(d) (3).
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Section 13 (d) (6) then provides exemptions from this disclosure
scheme for acquisitions made by means of exchange offers under the
Securities Act of 1933,16 acquisitions by the issuer of a security,-' and
(B) any acquisition of the beneficial ownership of a
security which, together with all other acquisitions by the
same person of securities of the same class during the preced-
ing twelve months, does not exceed 2 per centum of that class;
(D) any acquisition or proposed acquisition of a security
which the Commission, by rules or regulations or by order,
shall exempt from the provisions of this subsection as not
entered into for the purpose of, and not having the effect of,
changing or influencing the control of the issuer or otherwise
as not comprehended within the purposes of this subsection.1
Pursuant to rulemaking power granted by section 13(d) (1), the
Securities and Exchange Commission has promulgated rules 13d-1
through 13d-4, covering the filing of the statement, amendments to the
statement, computation of the percentage of beneficial ownership of a
class of securities, and an exemption from filing of amendments where
preemptive subscription rights to the stock of an issuer are exercised by
a shareholder whose holdings were greater than five percent on the date
of enactment."
Thus at least in the case of an individual, the disclosure require-
ments are mechanically triggered by an acquisition susceptible of docu-
mentary proof, and reporting is required within a fixed period of time.
Only two situations within the statute require examination of the sub-
jective nature of the term "purpose." The first, the discretionary
exemption under section 13(d) (6) (D), has not arisen because the
Commission has not yet promulgated any exempting rules based on
purpose to affect control.2" The second provision incorporating "pur-
pose" into the triggering mechanism, section 13 (d) (3), is more trouble-
16 Exchange Act § 13 (d) (5) (A), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (5) (A) (Supp. V, 1970),
redesignated § 13(d) (6) (A) by Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 1(b), 84
Stat. 1497.
17d. § 13(d) (5) (C), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (5) (C) (Supp. V, 1970), redesignated
§13(d) (6) (C) by Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 1(b), 84 Stat. 1497.
Section 13(e) prohibits issuer purchases generally, except in accordance with Com-
mission rules. See note 6 supra.
18 Exchange Act §§ 13(d) (5) (B), (D), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d) (5) (B), (D) (Supp.
V, 1970), redesignated §§ 13(d) (6) (B), (D) by Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-567, § 1(b), 84 Stat. 1497.
19 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9060 (Jan. 18, 1971), 36 Fed.
Reg. 976 (1971), amending 17 C.F.R. §§240.13d-1 to -4 (1971).
20 The only exemption under this section, rule 13d-4, SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 9060 (Jan. 18, 1971), 36 Fed. Reg. 976, 977 (1971), amending 17
C.F.R. § 240.13d-4 (1971), operates only to relieve persons already owning more than
5%, who acquire additional securities through certain preemptive subscription rights
and is conditioned upon a filing pursuant to § 16(a).
[Vol.l19:853
SECTION 13(d)
some. It defines as a "person" any two or more persons who act
together as a group "for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing
of securities of an issuer." In this instance, the normal evidentiary
problems associated with the search for a "purpose" are compounded by
the difficulty involved in reading this definition into section 13 (d) (1),
the basic disclosure provision. Rarely do groups coalescing to exert
control formalize their ties prior to buying securities, yet that appears
to be the situation anticipated by the statutory definition of a group
required to file. When the inquiry focuses instead on more common
situations where relationships are subject to change and less formal, and
where the acquisition of securities may predate the relationship, the
words of the statute provide little guidance in determining when dis-
closure is appropriate. A mechanical insertion of the definition of a
group into the text of section 13 (d) (1) suggests that disclosure is con-
ditioned upon first, the existence of two or more persons acting as a
group, secondly, acquisition by the group of the beneficial ownership of
an equity security, and thirdly, total beneficial ownership of more than
five percent of that class of securities following the acquisition."- This
problem of applying the statute to a group, along with difficulties in dis-
cerning the purpose of section 13 (d), are manifest in the Bath decision.
The breadth and depth of section 13 (d) are illustrated by compar-
ing its provisions with other disclosure requirements imposed on share-
holders by the Exchange Act. Section 14(d), the other provision added
by the Williams Act, requires disclosure of the information enumerated
in section 13(d) (1) by any person launching a tender offer which, if
consummated, would raise his ownership above the same five percent
triggering level. 2 While requiring disclosure before acquisition of the
securities, section 14(d) covers a much narrower class because it ex-
cludes those within section 13 (d) who acquire their ownership in any
manner other than a tender offer and includes individuals outside section
13(d) only in the rare instance when they attempt to reach the five
percent level of ownership through a tender offer and fail.23 Insofar as
one accepts the thesis that tender offers are launched only by those with
an intention to assert control immediately, section 13 (d) sweeps much
more widely than section 14 (d), requiring disclosure from persons hay-
21 Compare § 13(d) (1) with § 13(d) (3), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d) (1), (3) (Supp.
V, 1970).
22Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, §3, 84 Stat. 1497, amending 15
U.S.C. §78n(d)(1) (Supp. V, 1970).
23Thus, a person who has successfully completed a tender offer for more than
5% of an issuer's outstanding securities will have disclosed twice: once at the time
of the tender offer, pursuant to § 14(d) (1), and again when the securities are taken
up, pursuant to § 13(d) (1). Under the Bath decision, § 13(d) would cover even an
unsuccessful tender offer when used by a group of stockholders owning more than
10% (now 57) of the outstanding stock, because, regardless of success or failure,
disclosure by such a group is required when the members agree to act in concert to
acquire additional shares. See text accompanying notes 73-75 infra.
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ing no control motive 24 and regardless of the method of acquisition.
The other disclosure requirement imposed on shareholders by the Ex-
change Act may also be profitably compared with section 13 (d). In the
simplest case covered by the original section 13 (d), individual acquisi-
tion of the beneficial ownership of ten percent of a class of equity secu-
rities, disclosure of the fact of ownership would also be required by sec-
tion 16(a),2" which is primarily keyed to recovery of profits from
insiders trading in securities. But the latter section is inapplicable
below the ten percent level, and requires only disclosure of the fact of
ownership, not the detailed and extensive information required under
section 13(d). Thus by comparison to section 14(d), section 13(d)
covers a broader field of purchases and has a weaker correlation with
actual intention to control. By comparison to section 16(a), section
13(d) probes more deeply, eliciting detailed information about the
acquirer helpful in assessing any potential use of the acquisition to
assert control. Falling thus between these two, the language of section
13 (d) suggests that its purpose is neither disclosure from those attempt-
ing to gain corporate control nor disclosure from those attempting to
manipulate securities for market profits.
The following sections will analyze the development of the rationale
and mechanics of section 13(d) and show that Congress, while pre-
occupied with protecting shareholders and investors affected by a tender
offer takeover bid, intended through section 13 (d) to bring to the public
eye every rapid accumulation of securities which, because of its size and
unified control, carries the potential to affect the control of a corpora-
tion, and through that control, the market's valuation of the issuer's
securities. After examining the legislative history of section 13(d),
this Comment will argue that the overall purpose of section 13(d)
requires a broad reading of its language to eliminate the requirement of
either an acquisition or intent to acquire subsequent to formation of a
'24 The exemption provided in § 13 (d) (6) (D) does not modify the general statu-
tory scheme of ignoring intention to assert control. Although § 13(d) (6) (D) per-
mits the Commission to promulgate rules exempting certain acquisitions "as not
entered into for the purpose of" influencing control of the issuer, this section does
not contemplate a general exception for all cases where no control motive exists.
First, if Congress desired the statute to apply only to control cases, it could have
incorporated a general exemption instead of relying on the Commission's rulemaking
power. This reliance indicates that Congress intended that the Commission, in its
discretion, promulgate rules based on objective criteria and applying to certain limited
cases. This conclusion is buttressed by the differing disclosure requirements in
control and non-control cases under § 13(d) (1). Text accompanying note 14 supra.
Secondly, even if the Commission should provide a general exception in non-control
cases, the acquirer's burden of proving a lack of control motive and the Com-
mission's limited resources for such determinations would probably result in the
actual exemption of few acquisitions. Finally, the Commission has not, in fact,
granted any exemptions or laid down any rules based on the lack of a control motive.
Text accompanying note 20 supra. It appears that the enactment was designed to
require disclosure whenever a potential for control exists, leaving to investors the
task of assessing the probability and impact of its assertion.
2 15 U.S.C. §78p(a) (1964). This section is concerned with security market
values rather than control per se. See Feldman & Teberg, Beneficial Ownership
Under Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 W. RES. L. Rav. 1054
(1964). Compare Exchange Act § 3(a) (9) with § 13(d) (3).
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group whose members individually hold securities which, when cumu-
lated, amount to more than five percent of the class outstanding.
B. Historical Perspective
In the first session of the Eighty-ninth Congress, Senator Harrison
Williams of New Jersey introduced S. 2731,26 a bill which would have
amended sections 10 and 16(a) of the Exchange Act 7 to require dis-
closure prior to the acquisition of more than five percent of a class of
equity securities registered under section 12 of the Exchange Act.2"
The floor speech he gave in support of the bill was directed primarily
against actual corporate takeovers,2 9 but Senator Williams recognized
that his bill would also require that "any substantial accumulation of
shares of a company registered under that act must be preceded by the
filing of public information . . . . " " Although the advance disclosure
provision did not survive, Senator Williams at that time saw disclosure
of the accumulation as "the only way that corporations, their stock-
holders, and employees can be adequately prepared in advance to meet
the threat of the takeover specialist." ' Filling out the rationale for his
proposed scheme, he noted that restricting disclosure to cases involving
tender offers would leave "gaps":
:26 S. 2731, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
2715 U.S.C. §§78j, 78p(a) (1964). Section 16(a) requires officers, directors,
and beneficial owners of more than 10% of a class of equity securities of an issuer
registered under § 12, within 10 days after attaining such status, to file with the
Commission and any national exchange upon which the securities are registered a
statement giving the "amount of all equity securities of such issuer of which he is
the beneficial owner." Id. §78p(a). Section 16(b), id. §78p(b), causes any profit
from the sale and purchase of any security of the issuer within a 6 month period to
"inure to and be recoverable by the issuer." The Commission subsequently objected
to adding to § 16(a) the 5% disclosure provisions of S. 2731 because of the effect
on the provisions for short-term profit recovery. 112 CONG. REc. 19,004 (1966)
(Memorandum of the Commission in remarks of Senator Williams).
2S The general scheme of S. 2731 required ongoing disclosure under § 16(a) at
the 5% level and added subsections (c) and (d) to § 10, requiring a notice be sent
to the issuer and a statement filed with the Comission 20 days prior to either
acquisition of beneficial ownership of more than 5% of any class of equity securities
registered under the Exchange Act (proposed § 10(c)) or the making of a cash
tender offer which, if successful, would result in ownership of more than 5% of such
securities (proposed § 10(d)). See 112 CONG. REc. 19,003 (1966) (Memorandum of
the Commission in remarks of Senator Williams). The statement was to contain
substantially the same information now required under the Williams Act. See text
accompanying note 14 supra.
29 Near the beginning of his speech he stated:
In recent years we have seen proud old companies reduced to corporate
shells after white-collar pirates have seized control with funds from sources
which are unknown in many cases, then sold or traded away the best assets,
later to split up most of the loot among themselves.
111 CONG. REc. 28,257 (1965) (remarks of Senator Williams). He was later more
cautious in using similar terminology. See Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcolnm.
on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking & Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
123 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings on S. 510].
30 111 CoNG. REc. 28,259 (1965) (remarks of Senator Williams)
al Id.
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Substantial open market or negotiated accumulations of shares
may precede or accompany a tender offer or may otherwise
relate to shifts in control of which investors should be aware.
Where these accumulations are made in the open market there
are real dangers of manipulation to the prejudice of investors,
and in any case, the public is entitled to the protection result-
ing from advance disclosure of large-scale acquisitions. There-
fore, to complete the picture, the same notice and disclosure
provisions [as required before tender offers] also would apply
to any person or group before he or it can acquire or increase
ownership of such a security to more than 5 percent of the
class by means other than a cash tender offer. 2
He qualified his proposal in two ways to exempt acquisitions which
posed no threat to corporate control. First, because "casual purchases
and acquisitions which are not substantial should not be hindered," an
exception would be provided for an acquisition which together with all
others effected during the preceding twelve months would not exceed
two percent of a class of securities. Secondly, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission would be empowered to grant exemptions if par-
ticular acquisitions would not "in any way change or influence the
ultimate control of the corporation." " The latter provision, said the
Senator, would "further protect the legitimate buyer who may be ac-
quiring 5 percent of a corporation strictly for investment purposes and
with absolutely no interest in affecting management policy." " Thus
Senator Williams did not want to make proof of actual intent to assert
control a prerequisite to the working of the disclosure provisions; yet
he was reluctant to establish a rule requiring everyone-without exemp-
tion, and regardless of control motive-to disclose the required informa-
tion upon acquisition of large amounts of a corporation's equity
securities.
Senator Williams' proposals, however, soon underwent substantial
revision. In particular, disclosure in advance of acquisition was elimi-
nated. During the second session of the Eighty-ninth Congress, while
S. 2731 was still pending, Senator Williams had printed in the Con-
gressional Record a favorable memorandum on the bill from the
Securities and Exchange Commission.3 This memorandum recom-
mended that the provisions of the bill be added to sections 13 and 14
rather than sections 10 and 16, and laid out a scheme for the legislation
which remains substantially the same in the present Williams Act. The
Commission took the position that requiring advance notice of a pro-
321d.
33 Id.
34Id.
35 112 CONG. REc. 19,003, 19,006 (1966) (Memorandum of the Commission in
remarks of Senator Williams).
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posed acquisition would create difficulty, and argued instead that re-
quiring "a statement [be] filed not more than 5 days after the acquisi-
tion would be less burdensome to beneficial owners who become subject
to it." " The Commission also made a similar recommendation for
tender offer disclosure, but suggested an additional five day advance
confidential filing with the Commission only."7
This effort to better balance the burdens involved in disclosure
actually causes chaos for Senator Williams' proposed scheme if the
underlying rationale is still assumed to be providing notice to the share-
holders, management, and employees of a corporation of an outstanding
intention to acquire a potentially controlling block of securities. Rather
than being informed of impending purchases to facilitate action before
consummation of the transaction, these classes were to be informed only
of a fait accompli except insofar as a buyer was unable to complete his
acquisitions program within ten days (the figure later adopted) of the
time he exceeded the specified level. Senator Williams' original
rationale being inadequate to support the disclosure requirement, one
must look to subsequent legislative history for an explanation of the
perceived value of after-the-fact disclosure.
C. Later History of the Williams Act
S. 2731 was not enacted, but the next year Senator Williams rein-
troduced the bill as S. 5 10,38 the onlyimportant change being an increase
from five to ten percent in the level of stock ownership triggering the
disclosure requirements. When he introduced the bill, Senator Williams
commented on the terms which were to become section 13 (d) :
While some people might say that this information should be
filed before the securities are acquired, disclosure after the
transaction avoids upsetting the free and open auction market
where buyer and seller normally do not disclose the extent of
their interest and avoids prematurely disclosing the terms
of privately negotiated transactions.30
361d. 19,004. The Commission added, "Indeed, we envision some types of situa-
tions in which compliance with an advance notice requirement would be impossible,
such as acquisitions by inheritance or by gift of which the recipient had no advance
notice." Id. Not only would advance disclosure often be impossible, but in many
cases it would be misleading: a putative purchaser could decide against the acquisition
after filing; other investors could be induced into selling or buying on the basis of
the filer's initial intention. The requirement as enacted was filing within 10 days
after acquisition. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1) (Supp. V, 1970).
37 112 CoNG. REc. 19,005 (1966). This requirement was eventually dropped in
favor of simultaneous reporting and announcement of the tender offer. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(d) (1) (Supp. V, 1970).
38 S. 510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); see 113 CoNG. REc. 854-57 (1967)
(remarks of Senator Williams).
39 113 CoNG. REc. 856 (1967) (remarks of Senator Williams).
862 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.119:853
The Commission having previously given reasons why advance dis-
closure could not reasonably be required,40 Senator Williams now was
explaining why advance disclosure should not be required. Contrary
to the tender offer provisions and the initial scheme of the Williams
Bill, the modified Williams Bill, as this statement indicates, was not
designed to negate the normal inflationary market impact of rapid,
large-scale securities purchases. The central problem now is developing
a uniformly applicable rationale to justify the after-the-fact disclosure
requirement for open market accumulations.
In his statement opening the hearings on S. 510,41 Senator
Williams clearly distinguished from tender offers open market or pri-
vately negotiated purchases of securities as methods of obtaining control
of a corporation. Stating that "anyone acquiring more than 10 percent
of a class of an equity security" by either method would be required to
disclose under the proposed legislation, he explicated the purpose for
disclosure pursuant to each:
This is the only way that corporations, their shareholders and
potential investors can adequately evaluate a tender offer or
the possible effects of a change in substantial shareholdings. 2
Thus in the tender offer context disclosure was deemed necessary to
allow the stockholder to decide whether to sell or retain his securities;
outside that context, post-acquisition disclosure was viewed as provid-
ing a basis for market re-evaluation of the corporation. Senator
Williams' opening statement imputing this meaning to the new pro-
vision became sharpened as the hearings progressed.
Both Senator Williams and the Chairman of the Commission
argued that section 13 (d)'s disclosure was a necessary addition to the
provisions of section 16(a) 13 because the acquisition of a substantial
block of stock would enable a stockholder to "achieve the power to
influence the management and control of the corporation . ... ,,44
And, as the Chairman stated:
[Section 16(a)] does not give the public stockholders
adequate information about the arrangements surrounding the
acquisition or the purchaser's intentions with respect to the
company.45
Disclosure had to be extensive to allow investors to discount possible
changes in the issuer and the probability of change. Coverage had to
40 See note 36 supra.
41 Senate Hearings on S. 510, supra note 29, at 1-3.
42d. 2-3 (emphasis added).
43 Id. 24 (testimony of Commission Chairman Manuel F. Cohen) ; id. 36 (state-
ment of Commission Chairman Manuel F. Cohen).
44 Id. 36.
4 5 Id.
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be broad to insure including all persons who might attempt to assert
control.46 Although the sheer size of the block would cause some re-
evaluation of the issuer's securities, the number of shares and the
acquirer's identity were already provided by section 16(a). The value
of section 13 (d) lay in the disclosure of additional information concern-
ing the acquirer, the acquisition transaction, and the acquirer's future
plans. Such information would be valuable in calculating the possi-
bility of, and the effect of, an exercise of control.
The criticisms leveled at S. 501 during the hearings are also illumi-
nating. They illustrate that while objections were made to the entire
bill 4 and to section 13 (d) in particular, the Commission and Subcom-
mittee rejected attacks which challenged the need for, or the practicality
of, using the section to disclose the potential for change represented by
any given accumulation. Arthur Fleischer, objecting to the bill on the
grounds that "strong outside stockholder interests" were beneficial,
criticized section 13 (d) as redundant vis-h-vis section 16(a) and harm-
ful to the extent broader disclosure was provided.s He added the
observation that the disclosure of future plans from an outsider holding
only ten percent of the stock would be of little value, and that in any
case disclosure came after acquisition and too late to be used by an
investor in the market. The latter statement, of course, was no longer
responsive to Senator Williams' position. A letter from attorney
Milton H. Cohen offered a detailed criticism of the proposed legislation,
including the redundancy of sections 16(a) and 13 (d).11 He felt that
section 13(d) should be aimed at the "incipient situation or the situ-
ation where several persons act together in the acquisition of 10%" 50
solely to eliminate the loophole for these two categories in section 16 (a),
4 6 Acknowledging that requiring disclosure by every "person or group of persons"
who acquired 10% of a class of stock could be dysfunctional in some situations, the
Chairman stated that in cases of purchases for purely investment reasons, "[i]f we
are given authority to deal with that problem, we will as we have with problems of
this sort for the past 30 years." Id. 25. The Commission has not, however, pro-
mulgated any rules which would permit an acquirer of securities to omit disclosure
on the basis of his purpose for acquiring those securities. See note 20 supra &
text accompanying note 19 supra. The policy of the Commission to require dis-
closure from any person acquiring the requisite amount of securities is reflected in
Chairman Budge's testimony at the House hearings on S. 3431:
[Rep. Moss] : Does the Commission feel the normal reporting require-
ments should be applicable to the specialists or the market makers if the
percent is reduced to 5 percent?
[Chairman Budge]: I think it is very important that it apply to both
Hearings on H.R. 4285, S. 3431, & S. 336 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce &
Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
58 (1970).
4 7 E.g., Senate Hearings on S. 510, supra note 29, at 136-39 (statement of Prof.
Robert H. Mundheim, University of Pennsylvania Law School).
48 Id. 128-29 (Mr. Fleischer is a member of the New York Bar); see id. 65
(statement of Carlos L. Israels, member of the New York Bar) ; id. 161 (statement
of Francis R. Schanck, First Vice President, Investment Bankers Ass'n of America).
49 Id. 246.
o Id. 247.
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and that disclosure based on ownership alone, if any, should be limited
to the identity and holdings of any associates of the acquirer and their
present and desired representation on the issuer's board of directors.
Mr. Cohen leveled the criticism that section 13 (d)'s broad disclosure
requirement would apply to all acquisitions made after adoption of the
bill regardless of any intention to assert control, whereas pre-passage
owners would not be required to disclose any information beyond their
identity unless they were to take some steps toward influencing the
corporation's management 1-a result he found both anomalous and
undesirable. For this reason, Mr. Cohen preferred application of
section 13(d)'s broad disclosure provision only on the basis of an
intention to assert control. 2 The Chairman of the Commission replied
directly to this criticism, setting forth again the rationale for the Act:
With respect to open market acquisitions, we disagree
with the suggestion [of Mr. Cohen] that disclosure be
postponed until the acquirer actually assumes management or
makes a tender offer, since disclosure at that point would come
too late to inform the shareholders of the potential influence
represented by the existence of a block of this size. We also
do not believe that the situation of a person or group becoming
a 10% shareholder is analogous to that of an existing 10%
shareholder, since the latter's influence and intentions are pre-
sumably reflected in the corporation's policy and known to the
other shareholders.0
The first sentence of this rebuttal presents a reading of the section which
would require application to all cases of potential influence on control
rather than to only those instances of an actual attempt to assert control
or to situations where further stock acquisitions were seen as a threat
to the market. The Chairman's goal was a disclosure requirement
which would inform investors at the earliest possible moment of each
new aggregation of voting power which represented a possibility that a
change in the management of the corporation would shortly be effected
by the holders of the new block of securities. Although management
would be influenced by mere knowledge of the block's existence, the
Chairman was focusing on the period, usually brief, between the ac-
cumulation and actual exercise, perhaps by threat of a proxy contest, of
the voting power represented by the block. The second sentence ex-
plains the exemption of existing shareholders as consistent with the
51 "[T]he existing beneficial owner [must make] disclosures of this kind . . .
only if he becomes a participant in a proxy contest under Rule 14a-11, i.e., seeks to
take over management in some degree .... " Id.
52Id.
53Id. 201-02 (Supplemental Memorandum of the SEC with Respect to Certain
Comments on S. 510) ; see id. 242 (statement by Cohen, Swados, Wright, Hanifin &
Bradford, Attorneys at Law, Buffalo, N.Y.).
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logic of post-acquisition, pre-control-assertion disclosure. Just as sec-
tion 13 (d) (6) (B) exempts acquisitions totaling less than two percent
within a twelve month period 5 on the theory that slow accumulations
are unlikely to affect control, the exemption of existing shareholders
reflects a judgment that longstanding pre-enactment accumulations
would already have worked their effect, if any. Under the new rationale,
no reason exists to treat old and new owners on a level of parity.
Thus the Subcommittee and the witnesses at the Senate hearings
were aware that section 13 (d) as written,-5 and as later enacted with a
ten day period for disclosure, was to encompass every accumulation of
more than ten percent of a class of equity securities registered under
section 12 of the Exchange Act when that accumulation was rapid
enough to fall outside the two percent de minimis exemption."6 The
rationale developed for this scheme was that disclosure of the existence
of such a block of securities would provide shareholders and investors
with notice of the potential influence of this block on control of the
issuer. In attempting to correlate the means and rationale of this sec-
tion, the conclusion is compelled that the drafters believed that the speed
with which such a block is accumulated is sufficiently related to subse-
quent attempts to influence the control of a corporation to justify this
scheme of disclosure rather than some other scheme based on actual
intent to assert control. The decision to require disclosure of all such
blocks regardless of any control motive furthers an intent that the class
of shareholders and other investors felt to be in need of protection from
the vicissitudes of takeovers were to be so protected by being given the
opportunity to react to the mere possibility of such an intent in addition
to the actuality thereof. Unless management is considered the sole
beneficiary of this disclosure, a proposition vehemently denied after S.
510 was introduced, 7 those receiving the information have no effective
54 Exchange Act § 13 (d) (5) (B), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (5) (B) (Supp. V, 1970),
redesignated § 13 (d) (6) (B) by Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 1(b), 84
Stat. 1497.
55 No further changes were made in § 13(d), and no further attempts were made
to refine the rationale for the disclosure provisions. The House Subcommittee hear-
ings, Hearings on H.R. 14475 & S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce &
Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1968), focused on specific objections to other parts of the Act by interest
groups and related federal agencies; the relevant portions of the House Committee
Report, H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), and Senate Committee
Report, S. REP'. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), offer little additional assist-
ance. No significant floor debate took place before the bill was enacted on July
29, 1968.
56The legislative history of Pub. L. No. 91-567, lowering the level of dis-
closure to 5%, is similarly devoid of further explanation. The lower disclosure
level's function appears to be to flush out persons who acquired 97a of an issuer's
outstanding securities through open market purchases prior to making a tender
offer. See S. R P,. No. 1125, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970); Hearing to Ascertain
the Views of Hamer H. Budge, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, on Problems in the Securities Industry Before the Subcomm. on Securities
of the Senate Conmn. on Banking & Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1969).
57 See, e.g., S. REPl. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967); 113 CONG. REc.
24,664 (1967) (remarks of Senator Williams).
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means at their disposal to prevent the assertion of control. Rather,
they are being supplied with information necessary to adjust for that
possibility in their valuation of the corporation for investment purposes.
Each item of information required-number of shares acccumulated, the
acquirer's identity, his mode of financing, and whether his intent is to
acquire control-enters into the calculus in computing the probability
of a change in the management of the issuer due to the new block posi-
tion, and thereby influences the investor's decision whether to keep
constant, decrease, or increase his holdings in the issuer.
In terms of protection for investors, then, the method of aggrega-
tion is not vital, but rather the existence of a new aggregation itself. If
five percent ownership of a class of securities is deemed the point at
which disclosure is necessary for this rationale, the point set by the
amended Williams Act, then there is little distinction between a market
purchase of six percent and the grouping together of three previously
independent shareholders, each owning two percent. In each instance a
new block of securities exceeding the critical size has become subject to
a common control and direction. The latter block is not similar to one
held prior to passage, and thus exempt from disclosure, because the aim
of section 13(d) is disclosure of new aggregations which present the
possibility of a change. The logic of the Act assumes that longstanding
accumulations will have already effected their influence, and that slowly
acquired blocks do not represent a control threat. All new, rapidly ac-
quired accumulations are within the disclosure requirements because the
ability to influence control has been achieved, and only recently.
II. BATH INDUSTRIES, INc. v. BLOT
The decision of the Seventh Circuit in Bath Industries, Inc. v.
Blot5 5 resulted in the first construction of section 13(d) outside the
context of a tender offer. 9 The Bath controversy arose from the ef-
forts of several shareholders of Bath Industries, Inc., to obtain control
of the corporation by pooling their voting interests.60 Besides having
58427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'g 305 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
59 See note 11 supra. The only provisions of § 13(d) incorporated in the § 14(d)
tender offer provisions relate to the nature of the information to be disclosed. See
Exchange Act § 14(d) (1), 78 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1) (Supp. V, 1970), as amended,
Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 3, 84 Stat. 1497.
60 The controversy occurred at a time when Bath Iron Works, a Bath Industries
subsidiary, was a competitor for a contract described by the Seventh Circuit as
possibly "the largest shipbuilding contract ever awarded by the United States Navy."
427 F.2d at 104. The preliminary injunction against the defendants was sustained
on the grounds that
the district court could have properly concluded that the adverse effects
on Bath's position in the [contract] competition of a timely Williams Act
disclosure would have been significantly less than the adverse effects of a
disclosure coming after this action was filed and after the defendants had
already acquired sufficient Bath stock to make the change in management a
near certainty.
Id. at 113.
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purchased a substantial number of additional shares in support of their
efforts, the defendants had held over ten percent of Bath's voting shares
prior to any agreement to act together. Yet, as of the time management
brought suit to prevent this attempt no statement complying with the
requirements of section 13 (d) had been filed by any of the defendants.
Given such a complete disregard of the requirements, the court had
substantial freedom in construing the section because almost any con-
ceivable interpretation would have resulted in finding a violation.
Bath Industries is a Delaware holding company with business
offices in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Bath was created as a holding com-
pany in 1967 when one of its present subsidiaries, Bath Iron Works
Corporation, was reorganized. In July 1968 Emmet Blot, a member
of the Board of Directors of Bath and a shareholder since early 1966,
indicated some dissatisfaction with William Kyle, the chief executive of
Bath, and expressed the feeling that Kyle should be replaced. During
August of that year he informed the Board of Directors of Bath of his
belief that the corporation needed a new chief executive and that the
office of the holding company should be moved to New York City. Al-
though Blot found little support for his views among the members of the
Board, by April of 1969 he had found potential allies in the president of
Madison Fund, Inc., a registered, closed-end investment company, and
the vice president of Donner Corporation, which acts as investing agent
and nominee for the William Donner family."' These two expressed an
interest in purchasing Kyle's shares for either their corporations or
themselves and a meeting involving these two, Blot, Kyle, and several
other members of Bath's management was held in New York City on
April 19. No offer to purchase the stock came out of the meeting.
During the time between this meeting and the end of August, Blot en-
deavored to find more allies for an effort to gain control. He eventually
enlisted the cooperation of several financial institutions, but at the same
time revealed his maneuvering to Bath: another member of the Board
of Directors learned indirectly that attempts had been made to gain the
support of American Express, which operates a number of mutual funds.
A series of meetings ensued as the two sides tried to reach an accom-
modation, but when no agreement seemed possible, management filed
suit in federal district court alleging violation by nine specified defend-
ants of several sections of the Exchange Act, including section 13 (d).
The district court issued a temporary restraining order and then
held an evidentiary hearing on a request for a preliminary injunction.62
After finding that jurisdiction to entertain the suit existed under section
27 of the Exchange Act,' the court ruled that the defendants consti-
tuted a group which had probably violated section 13 (d) and, weighing
61 Id. at 105.
62305 F. Supp. 526, 528-29 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
63 Id. at 535-37.
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the "balance of hardships," granted a preliminary injunction against
proceeding with the plan to take control.64
The court's reasons for finding a violation were not fully developed,
and its technique of stating disjoint findings leaves some room for doubt.
The court merely stated that the defendants
constitute a "group" which has acted together for the purpose
of acquiring or holding the securities of Bath, as such a group
is defined by Section 13 (d) (3) of the Williams Act . . . and
which has beneficially owned, directly or indirectly, more than
ten percent of Bath common stock and preferred stock ...
The court concludes that the members of the group agreed to
pool their voting interests in Bath securities and to act in con-
cert to carry out their plan to obtain control of the corporation
through the election of a new chief executive officer of their
choosing and to increase the size of the Board of Directors of
Bath. In addition to pooling their voting interests it appears
that certain members of the group acquired additional shares
of Bath in order further to insure the success of their plan.65
Notwithstanding the last sentence quoted, the court went on to conclude
that the defendants should have complied with the provisions of section
13 (d) "[w] ithin ten days after the group described above agreed to act
together." 66 This statement indicates the district court's perception
that the agreement to act together rather than the acquisition of addi-
tional securities constituted the triggering act for purposes of section
13(d).
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit sustained the preliminary injunc-
tion and remanded the case to the district court for further proceed-
ings.0 7  The parties, before the court of appeals, each argued that the
legislative history supported their respective readings of the statute's
requirements. The plaintiff cited the House report on the Williams
Act 6 to support a disclosure requirement at the time of formation if a
group's members in combination held in excess of ten percent of the
outstanding equity securities of a corporation; 69 the defendants referred
to statements evincing an intent to require disclosure of securities pur-
chases.7' The court took a different perspective and found that the
64d. at 537-39.
65 Id. at 537. In further support of his holding, the district judge took judicial
notice of "the fact that Wisconsin is the most civilized state in the Union." Id. at
533 n.4.
66 Id. at 538.
67427 F2d at 114. As often occurs in a struggle for corporate control, this
decision ended the litigation and a settlement was announced on Nov. 4, 1970. Wall
St. J., Nov. 4, 1970, at 16, col. 1.
68 H.R. RP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
69 427 F.2d at 108-09. The case arose before the disclosure level was reduced to
5%. See note 13 supra.
701d. at 109.
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purpose of the Act was to protect investors, including "investors in gen-
eral as well as the stockholders of the specific corporation involved." 71
The court also noted Senator Williams' avowed intent "to avoid tipping
the scales either in favor of management or in favor of the person mak-
ing the takeover bids." 72
The parties having articulated what they felt to be the relevant
statutory considerations, the court held that compliance with the dis-
closure provisions of section 13 (d) is required
when, but only when, any group of stockholders owning more
than 10% of the outstanding shares of the corporation agree
to act in concert to acquire additional shares.7'
The court added an evidentiary presumption to this holding to offset
the plaintiff's obvious difficulty in proving the existence of such an
agreement by the group:
[O]nce it is shown that such a group has agreed to pursue a
common objective, and once it is further shown that a member
of the group has thereafter purchased additional shares of the
corporation's stock, then a rebuttable presumption arises that
such purchase was made pursuant to an agreement of the
group as of that date to acquire shares in furtherance of its
objectives. 4
The court thus ignored both of two possible readings of section 13 (d)
when a group's existing holdings exceed ten percent--disclosure within
ten days of formation, or disclosure within ten days after acquisition of
additional shares 7 -in favor of an interpretation that triggered dis-
closure in advance of the purchase but independent of any other con-
certed group activities in pursuit of control. Because of a superficial
inquiry into both the purpose of the Williams Act and the mechanics of
section 13(d), the court derived a simplistic reading of the legislative
intent: protect investors without helping management.
The requirement of pre-acquisition disclosure rested upon a finding
that although existing shareholders were free to discuss mutual concerns
with respect to the corporation,
71 Id.
72 Id. (quoting 113 CONG. REc. 24,664 (1967)).
73Id. In the first footnote of the opinion, quoting § 13(d) "in relevant part,"
the court omitted all exemptions provided by § 13(d) (5) except the 2% rule. See id.
at 101-02 n.1. If this was intended to suggest that there must be an agreement to
acquire at least 2% of the shares within a twelve month period it would narrow the
impact of the decision greatly. It would not, however, change the rationale of the
decision, and indeed it might narrow the class of shareholders required to disclose
so much that the statute would be largely nullified.
74 Id. at 110.
15See text accompanying note 21 mtpra.
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when such a group . . .reaches the point where it decides to
buy additional stock . . full disclosure . . .will be required.
[I]t is at this point that the need for the Act's protection
becomes critical.
76
This construction seems based upon a perceived statutory purpose to
protect investors from the market impact of purchases of additional secu-
rities rather than the market impact of major shifts in corporate voting
power and the attendant ability to influence management of the corpo-
ration. The latter would occur regardless of any additional acquisitions
where previously independent shareholders pooled their shares in fur-
therance of a joint purpose. The origin of this fundamental error is in
the Seventh Circuit's reading of "the overriding purpose" of the Act.
The court felt that disclosure is necessary "when substantial share-
holders or management undertake to acquire shares . . . for the pur-
pose of solidifying their own position . . . . 77 The analysis of the
legislative history laid out in the first section of this Comment demon-
strates, however, that the purpose of the Williams Act was to force
disclosure from anyone gaining control of large blocks of securities."8
Thus, the court's construction cannot be supported by the legislative
history.
Even if the court's view of section 13 (d)'s purpose is accepted, its
own decision recognizes the difficulty in fulfilling this purpose. Accord-
ing to the court:
Apart from the unlikely execution of a formal agreement
by a group to acquire additional shares . . . proof of such an
agreement to acquire would be difficult for anyone not privy to
the group's plan.7"
For this reason, any purchase made by a member of the group would
be rebuttably presumed to be on behalf of the group and in furtherance
of group goals. Although an argument could be made that a decision
to acquire additional shares would precede the actual purchase by at
least one day, a filing by the group ten days after a group purchase
would not constitute a section 13(d) violation under the Seventh
Circuit's decision. Speaking of the purchase date, the Bath court said
the acquisition would be presumed to have been "made pursuant to an
agreement of the group as of that date to acquire shares in furtherance
of its objectives." " Disclosure ten days after the purchase would not
protect against market effects of the transaction. At the same time, if
76 427 F.2d at 110.
77 Id. at 109.
78 See text accompanying notes 26-57 supra.
79 427 F2d at 110.
so Id. (emphasis added).
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no purchases are made after formation of the group, disclosure will not
necessarily be forthcoming, since the difficulty of proving the formation
of an intent to acquire remains. Thus, the real effect of the Seventh
Circuit's holding is to require disclosure only after additional purchases
have been made, a result which effectuates neither the court's goal nor
the purpose of the statute as stated by this Comment.
Further difficulty arises because the court's view of the rationale
of the Williams Act cannot alter the delay between the triggering event
and disclosure."1 Because disclosure lags behind the agreement to buy
more shares by ten days, substantial purchases may follow the triggering
event but be completed before disclosure, a sequence of events which
precludes any forewarning of the possible market impact of the pur-
chases. The existence of this lag underscores the fallacy of the Seventh
Circuit's construction of section 13 (d). Therefore, even assuming the
court's reading of the underlying purpose to be correct, the mechanics
of the Act make achievement of such a purpose impossible. This in-
consistency reinforces the conclusion that the purpose was to forewarn
of possible changes in corporate control, not to forewarn of possible
market activity.
Part of the court's difficulty may have stemmed from its attempt
to construe the statute without "tipping the scales" so as to benefit
management. The court implicitly assumed the legitimacy of existing
shareholders gathering to discuss issues relating to their corporation,
even to the point of formulating a "determination to take over control
of management." 82 The court's fear was that formulating a rule which
would trigger disclosure from a shareholder group immediately upon
formation would hamper such efforts by shareholders because manage-
ment would be apprised of the existence of the dissident group and
would be able to take prompt measures to thwart any actual attempts to
acquire control. If this was the court's thinking, there is no reason
other than the discarded market-impact rationale 3 why disclosure
should not be triggered only by actual purchases subsequent to the group
organization, rather than by the mere formation of an intent to purchase.
81 See Exchange Act § 13(d) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1) (Supp. V, 1970).
82427 F.2d at 110. The application of §13(d) to a group immediately upon
formation as urged by this Comment may arguably conflict with the philosophy
behind the exemption for solicitations of less than 10 persons contained in the proxy
rules. 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-2(a) (1971). Absent this exemption, Blot's conduct
would conceivably require disclosure by virtue of the definition of a solicitation in
rule 14a-1. Id. § 240.14a-1. The easiest resolution of this conflict is to note that the
10 person exemption is merely a Commission rule promulgated pursuant to Exchange
Act §14(a)'s general mandate. 15 U.S.C. §78n(a) (1964). The absence of any
substantial reference in the hearings or reports on the Williams Act to the proxy
rules indicates that Congress' intent was to require disclosure in every instance
within § 13(d)'s logic. This most recent enactment in response to Congress' current
view of the requirements of corporate democracy should take precedence over the
older proxy regulations, even before considering the superiority of a statute over a
rule. Cf. Comment, 71 COLUm. L. RE v. 466, 472 (1971).
3 See text accompanying notes 26-31 supra.
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Several commentators 84 have suggested that the Bath result is an ad-
mirable balancing of interests because it provides disclosure before the
takeover is completed, whereas if disclosure is delayed until "[a]fter
the triggering purchase has been made, . . . the takeover may already
be a fait accompli, thus nullifying the Act's goal of providing early dis-
closure." 8" But this argument assumes too much, because a share-
holder group may be able to acquire control on the strength of its mem-
bers' existing merged holdings without acquiring any additional shares.
If the purpose of section 13(d) is to require disclosure of potential
control changes, the aggregation of voting power in the shareholder
group is a more critical point for disclosure than a decision to acquire
additional shares to reinforce the group's position. Whether disclosure
under the Bath holding comes within ten days of the group's decision to
acquire more shares or within ten days after the acquisition, significant
undisclosed control manuevers will be possible. Thus in Bath, if the
original holdings of Blot and his allied mutual funds had been large
enough to assert control, the corporation could have been radically
altered without any advance disclosure to individual investors of the
possibility of such a change. This result is directly contrary to the
purpose of the Williams Act. The legislative history shows that Con-
gress' intent was not the disclosure of market purchases but the dis-
closure of all instances of rapidly accumulated voting power.
The correct result in a shareholder group situation is to require
disclosure within ten days of the formation of a group whose members'
combined holdings exceed five percent of an issuer's securities. This
would effectuate the Act's purpose of disclosing accumulations of large
security blocks in order to give investors maximum warning of poten-
tial changes. An initial problem with such a suggestion is that the
statutory construction necessary to produce such a result is somewhat
forced. Disclosure upon formation would be achieved by holding that
upon formation the group, as a distinct entity, acquires beneficial owner-
ship of the individual members' shares, thus triggering section 13 (d)
(1)'s disclosure requirements. But section 13(d) (3)'s definition of a
group for the purposes of the Williams Act is any "group [acting
together] for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of secu-
rities." Triggering disclosure immediately upon formation would make
the qualifying language following "group" in section 13 (d) (3) super-
fluous because any group acquiring beneficial ownership would have to
disclose without further inquiry into whether its purpose was to ac-
quire, hold, or dispose of securities."6 But an analysis of the Act indi-
cates that section 13(d) (3) was designed primarily for the situation
84 Comment, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1136, 1141 (1970); BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP.
B-, B-12 (June 17, 1970) ("The court's decision is an admirable blend of theory and
fact . ... ").
85 Comment, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1136, 1141 (1970).
86 See id.
[Vo1.119:853
SECTION 13(d)
where the group's members at the time of formation held no shares and
sought to buy up control while escaping section 13(d) (1) by limiting
individual purchases to five percent. In the absence of an assumption
of legislative perfection, the existence of redundant language in a specific
application of the statute does not call for rejecting the construction
which supports such an application. Section 13 (d) (3) can be read to
require disclosure from a group before any subsequent purchases; s7 the
legislative intent strongly supports such a result.""
A federal district court, in GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 9 deciding a
"group" case distinguishable from Bath in that no subsequent purchases
occurred, also ignored the legislative history. The Milstein court
reasoned:
Legislative history is extremely useful for interpreting a
statute when the Act's language is ambiguous. . . [But]
the specific statutory language [in section 13 (d) (3)] is clear
and compels the construction that the reportable event is the
acquisition of the requisite amount of shares and not the mere
formation of a group with a view to control."
This statement, however, followed a declaration that the term "acquisi-
tion" is nowhere defined in the Williams Act,9 an admission which
allows the reading suggested by this Comment. Subsequent court
decisions should disregard the Seventh Circuit's holding and that in
Milstein in favor of that construction of section 13 (d) urged by this
Comment, which most comports with the entire Act's purpose.
Potentially more serious problems with this Comment's interpreta-
tion of section 13 (d) result from the effects of such a sweeping disclosure
8T See Comment, 71 CoLUm. L. REv. 466, 473 (1971) ("such a construction of
the statute [is] permissible on its face"). The author, however, by giving great
weight to the professed neutrality of the operation of the Act's provisions, concluded
that such a result did not comport with the Williams Act's overall purpose.
8 8See S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1967):
The group would be deemed to have become the beneficial owner, directly
or indirectly, of more than 10 percent of a class of securities at the time
they agreed to act in concert. Consequently, the group would be required
to [disclose] . . . within 10 days after they agree to act together, whether
or not any member of the group had acquired any securities at that time.
This provision is designed to obtain full disclosure of the identity of any
person or group obtaining the benefits of ownership of securities ....
Professor Loss originally supported this view of the statute, see 6 L. Loss, SEcu-
RrriEs REGULATIOx 3664 (Supp. 1969), but has apparently changed his mind. See
GAF Corp. v. Milstein, [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. RE'. 1192,975, at 90,607
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 1971).
89 [Current] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1192,975, at 90,604 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22,
1971).
90 Id. at 90,607.
91 1d. at 90,606. The district judge's holding that disclosure is not required
absent actual post-formation purchases may result from using the erroneous market-
impact rationale for the statute in giving meaning to the term "acquisition." See
id. at 90,609.
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requirement. In addition to the defensive tactics presently available,92
management will have a powerful legal tool to use against any compet-
ing groups. Perhaps this result caused the Seventh Circuit to hinge
disclosure on an event after formation of the group. In fact, the inter-
pretation suggested by this Comment may have such a chilling effect as
to preclude any efforts by existing shareholders to assert control. Any
group that desired to assert control would have to file the required
documents at the time of formation, because any subsequent purchases
or actual efforts at control would alert management to seek immediate
injunctive relief from a district court." Significant information regard-
ing the takeover group would be publicly disclosed while management,
absent any share transactions,9 could maneuver in relative secrecy. But
Congress was well informed of the Williams Act's potential for harm,
especially the harm in endeavoring to protect investors caught in a con-
trol fight by giving an additional tactical advantage to incumbent man-
agement. Even granting the sincerity of Senator Williams' concern
with "tipping the balance," " the legislative history compels the con-
clusion that Congress intended to force disclosure of potential control
threats regardless of their form.
Another area in which a broad interpretation of section 13(d)
could cause difficulty is the activities of large financial institutions. 8
For example, a number of mutual funds with a common investment
advisor could be considered subject to section 13 (d) although individual
fund holdings did not exceed five percent. Further, institutional in-
vestors "acting together" to influence management policy might fall
within the definition of a "group." At the hearings on the Williams
Act representatives of these institutions objected to disclosure. They
02 See, e.g., Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 2, at 321-23.
93 The relief granted in Bath was a preliminary injunction enjoining the de-
fendants from proceeding with their plans to call a special shareholders' meeting and
remove Kyle, the chief executive officer. 427 F.2d at 114. As suggested by the
Bath court, 427 F.2d at 111 n.7, other relief measures are available.
94 See note 6 supra.
9 5But cf. § 13(d) (1): "Any person . . . [required to disclose shall] send to
the issuer of the security at its principal executive office, by registered or certified
mail, send to each exchange where the security is traded, and file with the Com-
mission [the information required by § 13(d)] . . . ." Although the latter two
means of disclosure may be expected to provide adequate public dissemination, the
first reflects a concern that incumbent management be the first to know. See also 6
L. Loss, SEcuTrrrEs REGULATION 3664-65 (Supp. 1969): "Perhaps the committees'
silence [in response to the arguments against the wisdom of the Williams Act, see
notes 47-51 supra & accompanying text] . . . reflects some philosophical overtones
here whose disquieting effect cannot be entirely removed."
96 See Comment, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1136, 1143 n.50 (1970). The magnitude of
this aspect of the problem should not be underestimated. The Commission has com-
piled statistics from a representative sample of the largest corporations whose stock
is traded on the New York, American, and over-the-counter exchanges, indicating
that at least 10% of the stock of each of 348 of the 656 companies in the sample was
held by institutional investors numbering 10 or fewer, and at least 15% of the stock
of 182 of those companies was held by institutional investors numbering 5 or fewer.
See SEculTEs & EXcHANGE COMM'N, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, H.R. Doc.
No. 64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5, at 2844-45 (1971).
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maintained that disclosure would have undesirable consequences, and
since mutual funds would never seek control, they and similar groups
should not be covered,17 section 13(d) being ultimately aimed at
potential control situations.
But such arguments are no reason for a court either to adopt the
Bath rule or to attempt to mold an exception for such institutions.
Congress did not enact a general exception for institutions in response
to the objections. Rather, the hearings on S. 3431 demonstrate a
relative lack of sympathy for the potential difficulties with section 13 (d)
of financial institutions and other dealers in large blocks of securities.
Senator Williams, for example, dismissed the problem of the burden
on market makers as speculative.9 Furthermore, the Commission was
given ample authority to exempt financial institutions from the dis-
closure requirements of section 13 (d), or at least to mitigate any hard-
ships. Section 13(d) (6) (D),99 contained in the original Williams Act
as section 13 (d) (5) (D), granted the Commission authority to exempt
"any acquisition . . . not entered into for the purpose of . . . in-
fluencing the control of the issuer . . . . " Section 13 (d) (5), added
in the recent bill which lowered the disclosure level to five percent,
granted the Commission authority to allow a more simplified statement
to be filed by a person acquiring the requisite amount of securities "in
the ordinary course of his business." : 10 According to the Report of
the Senate Committee which added section 13(d) (5) to S. 3431:
97 See Hearings on S. 336 & S. 3431 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the
Senate Comnm. on Banking & Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 101, 102-03 (1970)
(statement of Donald L. Calvin, Vice President, New York Stock Exchange) ; id. 110,
111-12 (statement of Richard B. Walbert, President, Nat'l Ass'n of Securities Dealers,
Inc.); id. 114, 116-20 (statement of Craig Severance, Chairman of the Federal
Securities Acts Committee, Investment Bankers Ass'n). Arguing that mutual funds
would never seek control appears especially unpersuasive in light of the role played
by several mutual funds in the Bath case. See 427 F.2d at 105-08. Although a fund
would probably not seek control for itself, its buying power or already owned shares
are available in a control struggle.
Indeed, the Commission itself-though reporting that "[i]nstitutions do not gen-
erally involve themselves directly in corporate decision-making . . ."-concluded a
recent study with the observation that:
Some institutions have been actively and significantly involved in facili-
tating contested transfers of corporate control. In such cases, unlike ordinary
corporate decision-making, the benefits to participating institutions may be
more certain: in addition to trading and tendering profits, institutions may
receive special inducements and benefits not made available to other share-
holders of target companies.
SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM'N, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, H.R. Doc. No.
64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5, at 2849 (1971).
98 HEARINGS ON S. 336, supra note 97, at 118 (reply of Senator Williams to
Gordon L. Calvert, General Counsel, Investment Bankers Ass'n).
09 Exchange Act § 13(d) (5) (D), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (5) (D) (Supp. V, 1970),
redesignated § 13(d) (6) (D) by Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 1(b),
84 Stat. 1497.
100
The Commission . . . may permit any person to file in lieu of the
statement required by . . . [§ 13(d) (1)] a notice stating the name of such
person, the number of shares . . . owned by him, the date of their
acquisition and such other information as the Commission may specify,
if it appears to the Commission that such securities were acquired by such
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Acquisitions by stock exchange specialists, over-the-counter
marketmakers, and investment companies might well fall
within the class of persons to which this amendment addresses
itself. While not exempting such persons from reporting, this
amendment will enable the Commission to make the reporting
provisions less burdensome for them by removing the require-
ments which do not appear necessary to protect investors.101
Thus, the construction of section 13 (d) suggested by this Comment in
order to provide the intended maximum protection to individual in-
vestors should not and need not have adverse effects on financial
institutions engaged solely in securities trading.
CONCLUSION
Although the primary evils aimed at by Congress in passing the
Williams Act were abuses of the cash tender offer device, the statutory
mechanism created also requires disclosure whenever any rapid accumu-
lation of voting power occurs. The goal was to give investors notice of
the potential for change in control of a corporation so that a more ac-
curate valuation of its securities might be possible. Thus, disclosure
should be required any time a group of existing security owners whose
combined holdings exceed five percent of the existing shares join to-
gether to act in furtherance of a common goal, because at that moment
they have acquired the organizational efficiency and economic power to
pose a control threat. A consistently rational interpretation of the
statute's words to cover the shareholder group situation is impossible;
disclosure within ten days of group formation is the construction of
section 13 (d) most faithful to Congress' purpose and is the standard
that courts should employ.
One must concede that such a broad disclosure provision will
significantly aid incumbent management in thwarting changes; in fact,
this aspect was a prominent source of objection to the entire Williams
Act. There can be little doubt, however, that Congress, through its
committees, was fully aware of the implications of section 13(d) for
corporate control struggles; a dysfunctional effect does not justify judi-
cial abandonment of the statutory intent. Rather, if Congress is dis-
pleased with the substantial advantage given management, Congress
may reconsider the wisdom of the Act and adopt remedial legislation:
person in the ordinary course of his business and were not acquired for the
purpose of and do not have the effect of changing or influencing the control
of the issuer nor in connection with or as a participant in any transaction
having such purpose or effect.
Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 1 (b), 84 Stat. 1497.
101 H.R. REP. No. 1655, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1970).
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either wholesale repeal or an attempt to carve out exceptions or special
rules for particular groups is possible."2
Imperfect statutes working hardships on innocent classes frequently
invite judicial creativity: to effect a minimum of undesirable conse-
quences it may on occasion be necessary for the judiciary to lubricate
the internal mechanics of a statute. In the process, statutory language
may clearly be stretched, meaning given contrary to any vision of the
legislation's framers. But license to construe so freely should not be
taken inconsiderately; judicial resolution of difficulties in statutory lan-
guage ought to be undertaken only with a well-developed awareness of
and sensitivity to the problems the legislature attempted to resolve.
Diverging from this standard in the Bath case, the Seventh Circuit has
established a precedent which, if followed, will do little to aid the share-
holder and much to further entrench management.
o102The recent passage of S. 3431, see note 12 supra, indicates, however, that such
a reconsideration is unlikely. Congress has instead widened the scope of § 13(d)
by lowering the level of beneficial ownership triggering disclosure from 10% to 5%.
Nevertheless, Congress should reassess its policy. Section 13(d) does seem an un-
necessarily harsh measure to correct takeover-related abuses. The present statute
operates to disadvantage those seeking control of a corporation, including groups of
existing shareholders, regardless of their intentions with respect to future manage-
ment of the corporation. If Congress' genuine concern is protecting against situations
where corporate "raiders" assume control and liquidate the corporation's assets in a
manner detrimental to the remaining shareholders, creation of a federal remedy for
waste of corporate assets would be a more efficient method than disclosure under
§ 13 (d).
